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Coalter: The Vicarious Liability of a Physician for the Negligence of Othe

THE VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF A PHYSICIAN FOR THE
NEGLIGENCE OF OTHER MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS
-NORTH
CAROLINA CHARTS A MIDDLE COURSE
-THE EFFECT OF Harris v. Miller1
"In short, just as a rule making a surgeon liable for every negligent act of every hospital employee under his [or her] control is too
harsh, a rule exculpating ... [a surgeon] for every negligent act of
persons under his [or her] control 2simply because they are not his
[or her] employees is too lenient."
I.

INTRODUCTION

Paramedics rush an automobile accident victim into the hospital emergency room. The treating physician quickly tells a
nurse to obtain x-rays of the patient's head, ribs, leg, and spine.
The nurse fails to request x-rays of the patient's spine when filling
out the x-ray requisition form. As a result, the patient's spinal
injury is aggravated because the injury is not promptly diagnosed.3 Under these facts, a physician could be held vicariously
liable4 for the negligence of the nurse,5 depending on how the
jurisdiction applies the doctrine of respondeat superior.6 In Harris v. Miller,7 the North Carolina Supreme Court enunciated the
standard that must be used to determine whether a physician is
liable for the acts of other medical professionals. 8 Vicarious liability is imposed on a physician if the physician in fact possessed the
right to control the other medical professional at the time the neg1. 335 N.C. 379, 438 S.E.2d 731 (1994).
2. Foster v. Englewood Hosp. Ass'n, 313 N.E.2d 255, 261 (111. App. Ct. 1974).
3. Lynn D. Lisk, A Physician's Respondeat Superior Liability For the
Negligent Acts of Other Medical Professionals: When the Captain Goes Down
Without the Ship, 13 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L.J. 183, 183 (1991) (Lisk poses this
example to highlight the complexities of the interrelationships in the health care
industry.). The facts illustrated above are similar to Davis v. Schneider, 395
N.E.2d 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979).
4. Vicarious liability is defined as "the imposition of liability on one person
for the actionable conduct of another based solely on the relationship between
the two persons." BLAci's LAw DICTIONARY 1566 (6th ed. 1990).
5. But see Davis, 395 N.E.2d 283 (holding physician not liable).
6. See infra notes 68-80 and accompanying text.
7. 335 N.C. 379, 438 S.E.2d 731 (1994).
8. Id. at 394, 438 S.E.2d at 740.
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ligence occurred. 9 The North Carolina Supreme Court arrived at
this standard by examining the traditional test for liability under
the borrowed servant rule. 10 In doing so, the supreme court overruled both Jackson v. Joyner," which the court interpreted 12 as
employing the "captain-of-the-ship" doctrine,1 3 and Starnes v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority,' 4 which presumed
that surgeons never enjoy the right to control a skilled specialist
15
like an anesthetist.
This Note examines the North Carolina Supreme Court's
decision in Harrisv. Miller.' 6 First, the Note addresses the facts
of the case. Second, it discusses the rules courts traditionally
have used to impose vicarious liability under respondeat superior,
the borrowed servant rule, and tests courts have established to
determine whether the borrowed servant rule even applies. Next,
the Note analyzes the Harris court's rejection of the "captain-ofthe-ship" doctrine, the professionals approach, 1 7 and the application of the "right to control" test.'. Finally, the Note concludes
that North Carolina has charted a middle course; a course which
recognizes that reality is at odds with the assumption that a surgeon has the complete right of control over all other personnel in
the operating room, 19 but a course that refuses to treat specialists
as independent contractors under the professionals approach.2"

II. THE CASE
In early 1981, Mrs. Etta Harris began experiencing back
pain.2 1 Mrs. Harris consulted Dr. Miller, an orthopedic surgeon, who 'diagnosed a ruptured disk requiring surgery. 2 2 On
9. Id.
10. See infra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
11. 236 N.C. 259, 72 S.E.2d 589 (1952).
12. Harris, 335 N.C. at 389, 438 S.E.2d at 736.
13. See infra notes 104-108 and accompanying text.
14. 28 N.C. App. 418, 221 S.E.2d 733 (1976).
15. Harris, 335 N.C. at 391-93, 438 S.E.2d at 738-39.
16. 335 N.C. 379, 438 S.E.2d 731 (1994).
17. See Lisk, supra note 3, at 189. The "professionals approach" means the
general idea of treating medical professionals as independent contractors due to
their skill, training, and knowledge. Id.
18. See infra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
19. See William H. Payne & K. Mike Mayes, Vicarious Liability and the
OperatingRoom Surgeon, 17 S. TEx. L.J. 367, 387 (1976).
20. See supra note 17.
21. Harris, 335 N.C. at 383, 438 S.E.2d at 733.
22. Id. at 383-84, 438 S.E.2d at 733.
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June 1, 1981, Dr. Miller performed a laminectomy 2 s at Beaufort
County Hospital, 2 4 where he had staff privileges. 25 "Anesthesia
was administered by Nurse Hawkes, a certified registered nurse
anesthetist 2 6 employed by the Hospital and assigned to the case
by the Hospital's Chief Anesthetist."2 7 In accordance with the
Hospital's Anesthesia Manual, Nurse Hawkes worked under the
"responsibility and supervision" of Dr. Miller for the duration of
the case because the Hospital did not employ a staff
2
anesthesiologist.
The Harris court concluded the operation was "doomed from
the start" due to Nurse Hawkes' failure to note Mrs. Harris' heart
problems during the pre-operative anesthesia evaluation. 29 Unaware of the heart problem, Nurse Hawkes administered anesthetic agents3' "that can significantly lower blood pressure in
23. A laminectomy is defined as "the surgical removal of the posterior arch of
a vertebra." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW WORLD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1267
(1971).
24. Harris, 335 N.C. at 384, 438 S.E.2d at 733.
25. Harris v. Miller, 103 N.C. App. 312, 316, 407 S.E.2d 556, 558 (1991). Dr.
Miller was in private practice. Id. He was neither on the hospital staff nor under
contract with the hospital. Id. Dr. Miller had applied for and obtained privileges
to use hospital facilities in the treatment of his patients. Id. A physician
acquires the right to practice in the hospital after being screened by the
hospital's credentials committee. See Stewart R. Reuter, Toward a More Realistic
and Consistent Use of Respondeat Superiorin the Hospital, 29 ST. Louis U. L.J.
601, 635 (1985). Medical staff bylaws and regulations govern the practice of the
physician in the hospital. Id. These bylaws probably are the closest thing to an
express agreement between the hospital and the physician. Id. An implied
agreement also exists that the physician will follow the hospital rules and
regulations in using the hospital facilities. Id.
26. Harris, 103 N.C. App. at 315-16, 407 S.E.2d at 558. A certified registered
nurse anesthetist is a registered nurse who, in addition to the studies required to
become a registered nurse, has attended a two year nurse anesthesia school and
passed a written examination. Id. Plaintiff's expert conceded that the quality of
care rendered by a certified nurse anesthetist is generally the same as the care
given by an anesthesiologist. Id. at 319, 407 S.E.2d at 560. An anesthesiologist is
a registered doctor specializing in administering anesthesia. See Payne & Mayes,
supra note 19, at 375.
27. Harris, 335 N.C. at 384, 438 S.E.2d at 733.
28. Id.
29. Id. Nurse Hawkes interpreted Mrs. Harris' chest x-rays as "negative,"
even though Mrs. Harris had an enlarged heart. Id. Additionally, Nurse Hawkes
failed to perform an electrocardiogram despite Mrs. Harris' mild obesity and
history of high blood pressure. Id.
30. Id. at 384, 438 S.E.2d at 734. The anesthetic agents used by Nurse
Hawkes were Demerol, Innovar, and Ethrane. Id.
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patients with depressed cardiac functions."3 1 Further, post operative x-rays revealed that the endotracheal tube was positioned
improperly so the tube was ventilating only one lung.2
Nurse Hawkes anesthetized Mrs. Harris at seven forty-five
that morning. 33 After the anesthetic was administered, Mrs. Harris' blood pressure dropped slightly3 4 and then continued to drop
steadly, "while her pulse rate rose dramatically."35 Thinking that
Mrs. Harris was feeling pain, Nurse Hawkes increased the anesthesia.3 6 Mrs. Harris' pulse rate remained high, however, and her
blood pressure did not increase because she was suffering from a
lack of oxygen 3 7 and too much anesthesia. 3 Nurse Hawkes did
not notify Dr. Miller that any problem existed.3 9
At eight forty that morning, Dr. Miller noticed an inordinate
amount of bleeding and applied small packs to stem the flow of
blood. 40 Because the bleeding had not stopped by nine o'clock, Dr.
Miller instructed Nurse Hawkes to start giving the patient
blood. 4 1 Nurse Hawkes did not administer blood to Mrs. Harris
until approximately forty minutes later.4 2 In the forty minute
interim, Mrs. Harris' blood pressure dropped to a level that was
"incompatible with normal brain functions,"4 3 and Nurse Hawkes
44
still did not alert Dr. Miller of Mrs. Harris' condition.
At approximately ten twenty that morning, Nurse Hawkes
administered a vasoconstrictor, causing Mrs. Harris' blood pressure to rise briefly. 4 5 Both Mrs. Harris' blood pressure and pulse
rate, however, soon plummeted.4 6 When Nurse Hawkes checked
31. Id.
32. Harris, 103 N.C. App. at 317, 407 S.E.2d at 558.
33. Harris, 335 N.C. at 384, 438 S.E.2d at 734.
34. Id. A drop in blood pressure at the induction of anesthesia is a normal
reaction to the anesthetic agents; "the blood pressure soon rights itself in
response to the stimulation of surgery." Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. The lack of oxygen resulted from the misplacement of the endotracheal
tube so that it was ventilating only one lung. Id.
38. Harris,335 N.C. at 384, 438 S.E.2d at 734.
39. Id. at 385, 438 S.E.2d at 734.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Harris,335 N.C. at 385, 438 S.E.2d at 734.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Harris, 335 N.C. at 386, 438 S.E.2d at 734.
46. Id.
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Mrs. Harris' vital signs at eleven ten that morning, Mrs. Harris
had no discernable blood pressure or pulse.4 7 Then, for the first
time, Nurse Hawkes informed Dr. Miller that Mrs. Harris was in
extremis. 48 Dr. Miller ordered Nurse Hawkes to stop all anesthesia and to give Mrs. Harris one hundred percent oxygen. 4 9 Dr.
Miller then made a partial closure of Mrs. Harris' back and began
50
resuscitation efforts.
Dr. Miller's efforts were too late to prevent Mrs. Harris' injuries; brain damage already had occurred between nine and ten
forty-five that morning.5 1 Mrs. Harris remained in a coma for
some time, but after regaining consciousness she was able to
return home.5 2 Over the next five years, however, Mrs. Harris'
health slowly deteriorated until she died on November 8, 1987. 5 3
Mrs. Harris and her husband filed a medical malpractice
action on April 1, 1983, against Dr. Miller, Nurse Hawkes, and
Beaufort County Hospital.5 4 On October 21, 1986, Mr. and Mrs.
Harris settled with Nurse Hawkes and Beaufort County Hospital,
releasing them from liability.5 5 After Mrs. Harris' death in
November, Mr. Harris was substituted as plaintiff,5 6 and the complaint was amended to allege Mrs. Harris' wrongful death.5 7 The
complaint alleged that Dr. Miller was negligent in both treating
Mrs. Harris and supervising Nurse Hawkes, as well as vicariously
liable for the negligence of Nurse Hawkes. 58
The trial court granted Dr. Miller's motion for directed verdict
on the issue of vicarious liability because there was insufficient
evidence of an agency relationship between Dr. Miller and Nurse
Hawkes. 59 The jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Miller on
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Harris, 335 N.C. at 397, 438 S.E.2d at 741.
50. Id. at 386, 438 S.E.2d at 735.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 386, 438 S.E.2d at 735.
53. Id.
54. Harris, 103 N.C. App. at 315, 407 S.E.2d at 557.
55. Id.
56. Id. Mr. Harris was the administrator of the estate of Etta Harris. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. This Note, however, will only discuss the vicarious liability allegation.
59. Harris, 103 N.C. App. at 315, 407 S.E.2d at 557. As an alternative ground
for the directed verdict, the trial court also held the release of Nurse Hawkes in
1986 relieved Dr. Miller of any vicarious liability. Id.
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the issue of his own negligence. 60 The North Carolina Court of
Appeals, Judge Phillips dissenting, affirmed the judgment.6 '
Plaintiff appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court on
the basis of the dissent,6 2 arguing the trial court erred in granting
3
a directed verdict on the issue of Dr. Miller's vicarious liability.
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals' decision and
granted Plaintiff a new trial. 64 In finding for Plaintiff, the Harris
court overruled both Jackson v. Joyner 65 and Starnes v. CharlotteMecklenburg Hospital Authority.66 Chief Justice Exum, writing
for the court, held that:
[A] surgeon should not, as suggested by Jackson, be presumed to
enjoy the authoritative control of a master merely because he is
"in charge" of the operation. To the contrary, under traditional
borrowed servant principles, the hospital must be presumed to
retain the right of control over its operating room employees. Nor,
however, should the surgeon be exempted from respondeat superior liability, as suggested by Starnes, merely because the negligence sought to be imputed is that of a skilled specialist. Whether
a surgeon may be held vicariously liable for the negligence of one
assisting in the operation depends on whether, in the particular
case, the surgeon had the right to control the manner in which the
assistant performed.6 7

60. Harris, 103 N.C. App. at 315, 407 S.E.2d at 558.
61. Id. at 330, 407 S.E.2d at 566.
62. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30 (1989).
63. Harris, 335 N.C. at 383, 438 S.E.2d at 733. Plaintiff also appealed the
trial court's exclusion of testimony by the plaintiff's expert on nurse anesthesia
care on the basis of Judge Phillip's dissent. Id. The supreme court also granted
discretionary review pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31 on the trial court's
ruling that the release of Nurse Hawkes extinguished the liability of Dr. Miller.
Id.
64. Harris, 335 N.C. at 400, 438 S.E.2d at 743. Justice Parker did not
participate in the decision. Id. Justice Meyer dissented on the ground that the
release of Nurse Hawkes extinguished the liability of Dr. Miller. Id. The
majority held the release did not relieve Dr. Miller of liability, basing the ruling
on Yates v. New South Pizza, Ltd., 330 N.C. 790, 412 S.E.2d 666 (1992). Harris,
335 N.C. at 400, 438 S.E.2d at 743. The supreme court also found the trial
court's exclusion of testimony by the plaintiff's expert witness reversible error.
Id.
65. 236 N.C. 259, 72 S.E.2d 589 (1952).
66. 28 N.C. App. 418, 221 S.E.2d 733 (1976).
67. Harris,335 N.C. at 395, 438 S.E.2d at 740.
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III.
A.

BACKGROUND

Respondeat Superior

Respondeat superior is a basic rule of agency 68 "whereby an
employer, master,6 s or principal is liable for the negligent acts of
his employees, servants,7 ° or agents when those acts arise in the
course and scope of their employment, service, or agency."71 The
rule originated in Jones v. Hart72 under the presumption that,
during the time of service, the master can exercise control over the
physical activities of the servant. 73 Thus, tort liability is imposed
68. "A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed
while acting in the scope of their employment." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 219(1) (1957).
69. "A master is a principle who employs another to perform a service in his
affairs and who controls or has the right to control the physical conduct of the
other in the performance of the service." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 2(1) (1957).
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1957) provides:
(1) A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of
another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the
services is subject to the other's control or right of control.
(2) In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an
independent contractor, the following matters of fact, among others, are
considered:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may
exercise over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct
occupation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality,
the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a
specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the
person doing the
work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is part of the regular business of the
employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation
of master and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.
Id.
71. Lisk, supra note 3, at 184.
72. 90 Eng. Rep. 1255 (1698).
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 cmt. a (1957). More modem
justifications for respondeat superior include the "deep pocket" theory, which
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because the master controls the instrument that causes the
injury.7 4 Consequently, because a principal does not control the
physical conduct of an independent contractor 75 in the performance of the undertaking, a principal is not vicariously liable.76
Respondeat superior is applied to the health care industry so that
a physician "is responsible for an injury done to the patient
through the want of proper skill and care in his [or her] assistant,
apprentice, agent, or employee."77 While the rules of respondeat
superior are relatively easy to apply when an employee serves one
employer, the doctrine becomes more difficult 78 when more than

one potential employer exists. 79 The borrowed servant rule has
been developed to help assign liability for employee negligence to
the proper employer.8 0
B. Borrowed Servant Rule
The most widely accepted version of the borrowed servant
rule is set forth in section 227 of the Second Restatement of
Agency. Section 227 states that "[a] servant directed or permitted
by his master to perform services for another may become the serimposes liability on the party best able to pay, and enterprise liability, which
seeks to place liability with the party who is best able to spread the cost of injury
throughout society as a whole, regardless of fault. See Reuter, supra note 25, at
604.
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 cmt. a (1957).
75. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(3) (1957). "An independent
contractor is a person who contracts with another to do something for him but
who is . . . [neither] controlled by the other nor subject to the other's right of
control with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the
undertaking. He may or may not be an agent." Id.
76. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 250 cmt. a (1957). "A principal
employing another to achieve a result but not controlling or having the right to
control the details of his physical movements is not responsible for incidental
negligence while such person is conducting the authorized transaction." Id.
77. 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 85 (1987).
78. See Nepstad v. Lambert, 50 N.W.2d 614 (Minn. 1951). In Nepstad the
court opined:
Though well established, the loaned servant principle has proved
troublesome in its application to individual fact situations. The criteria
for determining when a worker becomes a loaned servant are not
precise; as a result, the state of the law on this subject is chaotic.
Respectable authority for almost any position can be found, for even
within a single jurisdiction the decisions are in conflict.
Id. at 619-20.
79. See Reuter, supra note 25, at 605.
80. Id.

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol17/iss2/6

8

1995]

Coalter: The
Vicarious Liability
of a Physician
for the Negligence of Othe
383
VIcAIous
LIABILITY
OF A PHYSICIAN

vant of such other in performing the services. He may become the
other's servant as to some acts and not others.""' In applying this
rule, courts, uniformly agree the employee is presumed to remain
in the service of the general employer"2 in the absence of evidence
to the contrary.83 Courts focus the inquiry into which master
84
was being served on the specific act that caused the injury.
The employer that is found to have been the master at the time of
the act that caused the injury is vicariously liable, 8 5 whereas the
other employer is relieved of liability. 6 Courts generally agree
the determination of whether an employee has been borrowed is a
question for the trier of fact.8
The critical inquiry then is at what point does the employee
cease to be the servant of the general employer and become the
servant of the special employer.8 8 Jurisdictions have developed
several tests to help make this determination.8 9 Two tests that
are commonly used in the industrial world, "scope of employment"90 and "whose business,"9 1 have been held, however, to be
inapplicable to the hospital setting in all jurisdictions. 92 The obvious problem with the "scope of employment" test is the scope of
most medical professionals' employment with their general
employer encompasses their acts when working at the direction of
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 227 (1957). Comment (a) to section
227 states "[w]hether... the person lent or rented becomes the servant of the one
whose immediate purposes he serves depends in general upon the factors stated
in § 220(2)." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 227 cmt. (a) (1957). See also
supra note 70.
82. The "general employer" is the lending master and the "special employer"
is the borrowing master. See Lisk, supra note 3, at 190.
83. See Reuter, supra note 25, at 612.
84. See Reuter, supra note 25, at 613.
85. Id. An employer held liable under respondeat superior has the right to
seek indemnity from the employee who caused the injury. See Lisk, supra note 3,
at 185.
86. See Reuter, supra note 25, at 613.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 614.
89. Id.
90. See Lisk, supra note 3, at 192. "The 'scope of employment' test asks
whether the negligent act falls within the scope of the servant's employment with
the general employer." Id.
91. See Reuter, supra note 25, at 614. "The 'whose business' test asks
whether the act that caused the injury was done to further the business of the
general or special employer." Id.
92. See Lisk, supra note 3, at 192.
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the special employer physician.93 The difficulty with the "whose
business" test is the business of the special employer is rarely distinguishable from the business of the professional's general
employer. 94 Courts also developed the "administrative" versus
"professional" acts test, which holds a non-employer physician liable only for the "professional" acts of other health care professionals and holds the general employer liable for their
"administrative" acts.9 5 This test, however, has also been discarded in most jurisdictions because the distinction between the
96
two categories is unclear.
The most commonly used test is the "right to control." 97 As
the court stated in Keitz v. National Paving & Contracting Co.,
"[the] decisive test in determining whether the relation of master
and servant exists is whether the employer has the right to control
and direct the servant in the performance.of his work and in the
manner in which the work is to be done."98 The special employer
has the right to be present at the time the act occurs and to give
instructions as to what work is to be performed by the employee. 9 9
Liability does not shift unless the special employer has the right
to exercise direct supervision and control over the details of the
employee's negligent conduct. 0 0 A servant is the employee of the
person who has the right of controlling the manner of the
employee's performance of the work, irrespective of whether he or
she actually exercises that control or not.10 1 Actual control though
is strong evidence of the right to control,'0 2 and where the parties
93. Id.
94. Id. at 191.
95. Id. at 192.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 193.
98. 134 A.2d 296, 301 (Md. 1957) (emphasis in original).
99. See Reuter, supra note 25, at 625.
100. Id. See generally 57 C.J.S. Master and Servant § 566; Hodge v. McGuire,
235 N.C. 132, 69 S.E.2d 227 (1952) (citing § 566 with approval); Weaver v.
Bennett, 259 N.C. 16, 129 S.E.2d 610 (1963) (same). Section 566 states:
A servant of one employer does not become the servant of another for
whom the work is performed merely because the latter points out to the
servant the work to be done, or supervises the performance thereof, or
designates the place and time for such performance, or gives the servant
signals calling him into activity, or gives him directions as to the details
of the work and the manner of doing it ....
57 C.J.S. Master and Servant § 566.
101. Mature v. Angelo, 97 A.2d 59, 60 (Pa. 1953).
102. See Reuter, supra note 25, at 625.
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have made an explicit agreement regarding the right to control,
03
the agreement is dispositive.'
The captain-of-the-ship doctrine1 0 4 is an extension of the borrowed servant rule.' 0 5 This rule' 0 6 presumes a master-servant
relation ship merely from the presence of the surgeon and other
operating personnel in the operating room.10 7 Once the surgeon
enters his ship, the operating room, he has the complete right of
control over the other personnel in the operating room.108
C. North CarolinaPosition
North Carolina has long recognized the borrowed servant doctrine. 10 9 In Weaver v. Bennett," 0 the North Carolina Supreme
Court specifically adopted section 227 of the Second Restatement
of Agency, including the comments,"' as a correct statement of
the borrowed servant doctrine." 2 The supreme court also adopted
103. Harris, 335 N.C. at 387, 438 S.E.2d at 735.
104. See Lisk, supra note 3, at 196. The captain-of-the-ship doctrine was first
set out in McConnell v. Williams, 65 A.2d 243 (Pa. 1949). In McConnell the court
opined that "[iln the course of an operation in the operating room of a hospital
and until the surgeon leaves that room at the conclusion of the operation... he is
in the same complete charge of those who are present and assisting him as the
captain of a ship over all on board.... ." Id. at 246.
105. See Lisk, supra note 3, at 196.
106. The phrase "captain-of-the-ship doctrine" is used in this Note in its
expansive sense, referring to the presumption of a master-servant relationship
merely from the presence of the surgeon and other operating personnel in the
operating room. Some jurisdictions use the phrase in a more restrictive sense
simply to refer to the borrowed servant doctrine as it applies to the surgeon in
the operating room, without presuming any master-servant' relation merely
because of the surgeon's presence. The different usages of the "captain-of-theship doctrine" results from differing interpretations of McConnell, 65 A.2d 243.
See Franklin v. Gupta, 567 A.2d 524, 536-37 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990). This
restrictive use of the phrase makes it difficult to effectively categorize the
approach of various jurisdictions to the borrowed servant doctrine in list form.
Such a categorization is beyond the scope of this Note.
107. See Payne & Mayes, supra note 19, at 387.
108. Id.
109. See Weaver v. Bennett, 259 N.C. 16, 129 S.E.2d 610 (1963); Leonard v.
Tatum & Dalton Transfer Co., 218 N.C. 667, 12 S.E.2d 729 (1940).
110. 259 N.C. 16, 129 S.E.2d 610 (1963).
111. See supra note 80.
112. Weaver, 259 N.C. at 27, 129 S.E.2d at 617-18.
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the right to control test. 1 13 The court reaffirmed these principles
in Harrisv. Miller.114
Surprisingly, North Carolina appellate courts have had only

two occasions to test the liability of a surgeon for the negligence of
operating room personnel under the borrowed servant rule. 1 5 In
Jackson v. Joyner,"6 an eight-year-old girl died after a tonsillectomy due to anesthesia complications."17 The girl's mother had

requested that her family physician administer the anesthesia,
but Dr. Joyner rejected the request, arranging for Nurse Hanson
to assist instead." 8 The North Carolina Supreme Court held the
trial court erred in removing the issue of respondeat superior from
the jury, reasoning that "Dr. Joyner, as surgeon in charge, had full
power of control over the nurses, including Nurse Hanson, so as to
make him responsible for the way and manner in which the anesthetic was administered by Hanson. " ' 19
In Starnes v. Charlotte-MecklenburgHospital Authority,' 20 a
newborn was burned during a surgical procedure by a hot water

bottle used to keep the infant warm during the surgery.' 2 '
"Warming the infant during the surgery was the responsibility of
the nurse anesthetist. " 122 Plaintiff alleged the surgeon should be
vicariously liable for the negligence of the nurse. 12 Affirming a
directed verdict for the surgeon entered by the trial court, the
court of appeals stated that "[a]bsent some conduct or situation
that should reasonably place the surgeon on notice of negligent
procedure, we think 2the
surgeon is entitled to rely on the expertise
4
of the anesthetist."

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 28, 129 S.E.2d at 619.
335 N.C. 379, 438 S.E.2d 731 (1994).
Id. at 388, 438 S.E.2d at 736.
236 N.C. 259, 72 S.E.2d 589 (1952).
Harris, 103 N.C. App. at 324, 407 S.E.2d at 562.
Jackson, at 251, 72 S.E.2d at 591.
Jackson, 236 N.C. at 261, 72 S.E.2d at 591.
28 N.C. App. 418, 221 S.E.2d 733 (1976).
Starnes, 28 N.C. App. at 419, 221 S.E.2d at 735.
Id. at 422, 221 S.E.2d at 737.
Id. at 424-25, 221 S.E.2d at 738.
Id. at 425, 221 S.E.2d at 738.
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ANALYSIS

Captain of the Ship Doctrine Rejected

The North Carolina Supreme Court began its analysis in Harris by reviewing prior North Carolina case law. The court first
looked at Jackson v. Joyner. 2 5 The supreme court concluded that
the Jackson court appears to have presumed that Dr. Joyner
enjoyed the right to control from the mere fact that he was the
"surgeon in charge." 126 This presumption runs contrary to the
borrowed servant rule, part of which is that the lender rather than
12 7
the borrower is presumed to retain the right of control.
The supreme court noted that long ago hospitals may have
been a mere provider of beds for the sick. 128 As such, hospitals did
not control the treatment of the patient. The physician had complete control over the patient's treatment and his assistants.
Thus, at the time, a presumption that the physician had the right
of control was not unreasonable. Now, however, hospitals are in
the business of treating the sick and injured. 129 Hospitals exercise significant control over the manner in which their employees
provide treatment. 13 0 This control is accomplished through the
use of hiring criteria, training, formal practice guidelines, 13 1 hierarchical supervision structures, peer review groups, and disciplinary measures. 132 Moreover, surgeons are not the only experts in
the operating room. 133 Nurses, technicians, and anesthetists all
have extensive training in their fields and do not rely on the surgeon to direct them.13 1 In light of these realities, the supreme
court held that the captain-of-the-ship doctrine-a presumption
125. 236 N.C. 259, 72 S.E.2d 589 (1952).
126. Harris,335 N.C. at 389, 438 S.E.2d at 736.
127. Id.
128. See Reuter, supra note 25, at 632.
129. Harris,335 N.C. at 389, 438 S.E.2d at 737.
130. Id. at 390, 438 S.E.2d at 737.
131. Id. These guidelines are a prerequisite to accreditation by the Joint
Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (formerly known
as the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals). See Reuter, supra
note 25, at 633. These guidelines can have immense importance because, as in
Harris,they can be characterized as an agreement between the surgeon and the
hospital as to who has the right to control. See Harris, 335 N.C. at 395, 438
S.E.2d at 740.
132. Harris,335 N.C. at 390, 438 S.E.2d at 737.
133. Id.
134. See Payne & Mayes, supra note 19, at 387-90.
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that the physician has the right to control-does not apply in
North Carolina and, hence, overruled Jackson.135
The overruling of Jackson emphasizes the depths of disfavor
to which the captain-of-the-ship doctrine has fallen, and the Harris court's decision exemplifies this disfavor, particularly when
rescinding Jackson was unnecessary. More specifically, the opinion in Jackson never explicitly adopted the captain-of-the-ship
doctrine; the court only seemingly applied the doctrine by using
the phrase "as surgeon in charge."1 3 6 The Harriscourt, therefore,
could have easily reconciled Jackson by interpreting Jackson as
applying the right to control test, primarily because the Jackson
court found Dr. Joyner "had full power of control over the nurses,"
including control over the "manner in which the anesthetic was
administered;" 13 7 and as such, the rights to select and to discharge
indicated a master-servant relationship. 138 Furthermore, Dr.
Joyner did in fact arrange for Nurse Hanson to administer the
anesthesia, against the express wishes of the mother, 13 9 which
unequivocally indicates Dr. Joyner had the right to control Nurse
Hanson and was therefore liable under respondeat superior.
Because, however, the opinion in Jackson did "not sufficiently elucidate the right to control issue,"' 4 ° the Harris court overruled
Jackson in order to make the point that not only is the captain-ofthe-ship doctrine dead, but courts must use the right to control
analysis as well as its language.
B.

ProfessionalsApproach Rejected

The Harris court next looked at the "professionals
approach" 14 ' and in doing so revisited Starnes v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority. 4 2 The Harris court interpreted
Starnes to stand for the proposition that where the negligence
sought to be imputed is of a specialist, surgeons should be
exempted altogether from respondeat superior liability on the
assumption that surgeons never enjoy the right of control over an
135. See Harris, 335 N.C. at 391, 438 S.E.2d at 738.
136. Jackson, 236 N.C. at 261, 72 S.E.2d at 591.
137. Jackson, 236 N.C. at 261, 72 S.E.2d at 591. See supra note 119 and
accompanying text.
138. See Mature, 97 A.2d at 61.
139. Harris, 335 N.C. at 391, 438 S.E.2d at 738.
140. Id. at 389, 438 S.E.2d at 736.
141. See supra note 17.
142. 28 N.C. App. 418, 221 S.E.2d 733 (1976).
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assisting specialist. 4 3 The Harris court summarily rejected this
view. 14 4 While the Harriscourt acknowledged surgeons generally
rely on assisting specialists to perform without supervision, the
court stated that surgeons do sometimes have the right to control
such assistants. 4 5 The surgeon may have a contractual right to
control assistants, assert actual control over an inexperienced
assistant, and possibly a general right to control assistants in
146
emergency situations.
The Harris court, however, did not discuss the policy advantages behind the rule in Starnes.14 Traditionally, the primary
benefit of applying respondeat superior to the surgeon was it
allowed the patient, who could not recover from the hospital due
to the doctrine of charitable immunity, to obtain some recovery for
his or her injuries. 14 The North Carolina Supreme Court, on the
other hand, has held, in Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hospital,
Inc. ,149 that the doctrine of charitable immunity no longer applies
to hospitals and, therefore, injured patients may recover from the
hospital for their injuries.
The real parties in interest in many borrowed servant cases
are insurance companies, since they actually seek indemnification
from another or other insurance companies. 150 If the liability for
specialists assisting the surgeon was assigned to the hospital, as
under the Starnes rule, then this would avoid the duplication of
coverage and lead to lower overall insurance costs.15 1 Also, under
an enterprise liability theory, the hospital is in the best position to
spread the costs of injuries throughout society as a whole.' 52
Lastly, the hospital is in the best position to prevent the negli143. Harris,335 N.C. at 392-93, 438 S.E.2d at 738-39.
144. Id. at 393, 438 S.E.2d at 739.
145. Id.
146. Id. The general right to control in emergency situations is somewhat
troubling. The Harriscourt mentioned it as a possible situation where a surgeon
may have the right to control, whether the surgeon actually exercises control or
not, but the court gave no further clarification. The general tenor of the
argument suggests in this case the right to control question could turn into a
"battle of the experts."
147. The Harris court was aware of these arguments as the court cited to
Reuter, supra note 25, at 665-60, in which these considerations are pointed out.
148. See Reuter, supra note 25, at 655.
149. 269 N.C. 1, 152 S.E.2d 485 (1967).
150. See Reuter, supra note 25, at 657.

151. Id.
152. Id.
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gence of its employees. 1 5 3 For example, the hospital has a longterm relationship with the employee, trains the employee, and has
the opportunity to monitor the employee.1 54 Conversely, the physician's only contact with the employee may be during the procedure itself. Thus, imposing respondeat superior liability on the
hospital would encourage the hospital to take active steps to minimize employee negligence. 155
C.

Middle Course

The Supreme Court of North Carolina has chosen to chart a
middle course, applying the doctrine of respondeat superior in the
hospital setting in the same manner as it is applied in other
employment settings. Applying the borrowed servant doctrine in
Harris v. Miller,'5 6 the supreme court found the plaintiff's evidence of a master-servant relationship between Nurse Hawkes
and Dr. Miller was legally sufficient to be considered by the
jury.1 57 The court considered a provision 158 in the Hospital's
Anesthesia Manual, which Dr. Miller agreed to as a condition of
his staff privileges, to be persuasive 1 5 9 evidence of Dr. Miller's
right to control Nurse Hawkes. 160 When read in a light most
favorable to the Plaintiff, the provision manifests Dr. Miller's
right to control Nurse Hawkes.' 6 1 The Harris court also pointed
to testimony that, in an emergency situation, the surgeon has the
right to control an anesthetist's every act.' 62 Further, Dr. Miller
63
may have in fact exercised actual control when he ordered
Nurse Hawkes to stop all anesthesia and to give Mrs. Harris one
hundred percent oxygen.'
153. See Reuter, supra note 25, at 658.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. 335 N.C. 379, 438 S.E.2d 731 (1994).
157. Id. at 395, 438 S.E.2d at 740.
158. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
160. Harris, 335 N.C. at 395, 438 S.E.2d at 740. The court of appeals
interpreted the Anesthesia Manual provision to vest "the surgeon with the right
of supervision, not control: the power merely to point out the work to be done but
not to direct the manner in which the work is to be performed." Id.
161. Id. at 396, 438 S.E.2d at 741.
162. Id.
163. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
164. Harris,335 N.C. at 397, 438 S.E.2d at 741.
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Other jurisdictions have also recently adopted this "middle
approach." In Franklin v. Gupta,'165 the Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland applied the traditional borrowed servant rule in
determining whether the plaintiff was entitled to a jury instruction captioned "Responsibility and Liability of Surgeon-the Captain-of-the-Ship Doctrine." 6 This case involved a respondeat
superior claim against a physician for the negligence of a nurse
1 67
anesthetist in administering anesthesia before an operation.
Not only was the anesthesia ineffective, but the anesthesia caused
the patient to suffer physical and emotional trauma, and the surgery was eventually cancelled.' 6 8

After reviewing how other

courts have dealt with the issue, the Franklin court rejected the
captain-of-the-ship doctrine, stating:
The correct doctrine to apply is the traditional "borrowed servant"
rule. Where the evidence suffices to support a finding that the
surgeon in fact had or exercised the right to control the details of
another person's work or conduct in the operating room and the
other elements of the rule are satisfied, the trier of fact may find
liable
that the surgeon was the "special employer" and
69 is therefore
for the negligence of the borrowed servant.'
The Franklin court found there was no evidence the physician in
any way supervised or controlled, attempted to supervise or control, or had the power to supervise or control the conduct or decisions of the anesthetist. 170 The court, therefore, affirmed the
17
denial of the instruction. '

The "middle approach" used in both Harris and Franklin is
superior to both the captain-of-the-ship doctrine, which presumes
a master-servant relation by the mere presence of the surgeon,
and the professionals approach, which presumes that a surgeon
never enjoys the right of control over a skilled specialist. The captain-of-the-ship doctrine has become antiquated, refusing to
acknowledge that hospitals are now in the business of treating the
sick and injured. The professionals approach fails to account for
certain situations where a physician does have the right to control
even a skilled assistant. A physician may in fact have a contrac165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

567 A.2d 524 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 572 A.2d 182 (Md. 1990).
Franklin, 567 A.2d at 539.
Id. at 524.
Id.
Id. at 524.
Id.

171. Id.
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tual right or obligation to control an assistant, or may assert
actual control over an assistant, or may have a general right to
control assistants during an emergency situation. 172 Neither the
"deep pockets" theory, the "enterprise liability" theory, nor a judicial policy to increase a hospital's efforts to prevent employee negligence justifies a presumption by courts exculpating the
physician for every negligent act of a skilled specialist under his
control. If policy considerations do justify such a rule, it is the
province of the legislature, not the judiciary, to sanction a depar173
ture from the traditional rules of agency.
D.

Effect of Harris
The most obvious effect of Harris is the decision should clear
up the prevailing uncertainty which lower courts faced in applying
respondeat superior to the liability of a physician174 for the negligent acts of other medical professionals. Jackson and Starnes
took two widely divergent approaches. First, Jackson had been
interpreted by the supreme court to presume that a surgeon has
the right to control those persons assisting him in the course of an
operation by the surgeon's mere presence in the operating room.
And second, Starnes had been interpreted to presume a surgeon
never enjoys the right to control a skilled specialist. The apparent
contradictory nature of these decisions placed lower courts in a
quandary as to which rule to apply. Harris now provides clear
guidance as to the application of respondeat superior in any
setting.
Whether Harris generally will either increase or decrease a
physician's exposure to liability is uncertain. Presently, it is
unclear how much reliance lower courts placed on the contradictory opinions in Jackson and Starnes. The effect of Harris in this
regard depends greatly on how strong the traditional presumption
that the general employer retains the right of control is taken to
be. Cases applying the borrowed servant rule in an industrial set172. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
173. See State v. Waddell, 282 N.C. 431, 476-77, 194 S.E.2d 19, 48 (1973)
(Opinions of the North Carolina Supreme Court "abound with declarations that
public policy is the exclusive province of the legislature

....

")

(Sharp, J.,

concurring).
174. Given the broad application of the traditional rules of agency, there is no
reason to believe the rule in Harris is limited to the liability of a surgeon in an
operating room. The rule in Harris appears to apply to any master-servant
relation. It applies to physicians and surgeons inside and outside the operating
room.
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ting shed little light on the actual strength of the presumption. 175
Obviously, the stronger the presumption is, the less exposure the
physician will have to vicarious liability.
Another effect of Harrisgenerally may be to preclude a physician from obtaining a judgment as a matter of law, absent an
agreement clearly allocating control over the servant to the hospital. One of the basic principles of the borrowed servant rule is the
determination of whether an employee has been borrowed is generally made by the trier of fact. 1 76 Also, given the North Carolina
Supreme Court's willingness to accept the contention that surgeons have the right to control skilled specialists during emergencies, 1 7 7 judgments as a matter of law should be rare. Already, in
Rouse v. Pitt County Memorial Hospital,7 8 the court of appeals,
citing Harris,reversed summary judgment granted in favor of two
physicians on a borrowed servant claim. Plaintiff filed suit
against two attending physicians in connection with the care provided by resident physicians who actually delivered the plaintiff's
child. 17 While the residents were not employees of the attending
physicians and were paid salaries by Pitt Memorial Hospital, the
court of appeals found that the contents of an Affiliation Agreement18 0 between Pitt Memorial Hospital and the East Carolina
School of Medicine, and bylaws of the hospital's medical staff 1 '
were sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the defendants had the right to control. 1 82 In light of
Harris and Rouse, if physicians want to obtain summary judg175. The North Carolina Supreme Court merely states that absent "evidence to
the contrary, the original employer is presumed to retain the right of control."
Harris 335 N.C. at 388, 438 S.E.2d at 736 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 227 cmt. b). The court gives no further guidance as to the sufficiency of
the evidence necessary to overcome this presumption, other than, where the
parties have an explicit agreement allocating the right to control, the agreement
will be dispositive. Harris,335 N.C. at 387, 438 S.E.2d at 735.
176. See Mature, 97 A.2d at 61.
177. See Harris, 335 N.C. at 393, 438 S.E.2d at 739.
178. 116 N.C. App. 241, 447 S.E.2d 505 (1994).
i79. Id. at 243, 447 S.E.2d at 507.
180. The Affiliation Agreement provided the resident physicians "shall be
responsibly involved in patient care under the supervision of the Dean and the
faculty of the School of Medicine." Rouse, 116 N.C. App. at 248, 447 S.E.2d at
510. Attending physicians were employed by the East Carolina School of
Medicine.
181. The bylaws provided residents "will only practice under the direction of
the department chairman or his delegate." Id.
182. Id. at 249, 447 S.E.2d at 510.
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ment, they must be keenly aware of all agreements that could possibly allocate the right of control.
V.

CONCLUSION

The North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Harris v.
Miller 8 3 sets forth the standard used to determine whether a
physician is liable for the negligent acts of other medical professionals. In doing so, the supreme court overruled the only two previous cases where North Carolina appellate courts have applied
the borrowed servant rule to the liability of a surgeon for the negligence of operating room personnel. In applying respondeat superior to the hospital setting, the supreme court charted a middle
course, holding a surgeon may be held liable under the doctrine of
respondeat superior for the negligence of even a skilled assistant
if the surgeon in fact possessed the right to control that assistant
at the time of the assistant's negligent act. While all of the potential effects of Harris are uncertain, any future decisions applying
the borrowed servant doctrine are certain to be more uniform than
past decisions.
J. Scott Coalter

183. 335 N.C. 379, 438 S.E.2d 731 (1994).
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